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Abstract.	Can	we	employ	the	property	of	rationality	 in	establishing	what	rationality	
requires?	According	to	a	central	and	formal	thesis	of	John	Broome’s	work	on	rational	
requirements,	 the	 answer	 is	 ‘no’	 –	 at	 least	 if	 we	 expect	 a	 precise	 answer.	 In	
particular,	Broome	argues	that	(i)	the	property	of	full	rationality	(i.e.	whether	or	not	
you	 are	 fully	 rational)	 is	 independent	 of	 whether	 we	 formulate	 conditional	
requirements	of	rationality	as	having	a	wide	or	a	narrow	logical	scope.	That	is,	(ii)	by	
replacing	 a	 wide-scope	 requirement	 with	 a	 corresponding	 narrow-scope	
requirement	(or	vice	versa),	we	do	not	alter	the	situations	in	which	a	person	is	fully	
rational.	As	a	consequence,	(iii)	the	property	of	full	rationality	is	unable	to	guide	us	in	
determining	whether	a	 rational	 requirement	has	a	wide	or	a	narrow	 logical	 scope.	
We	cannot	resolve	the	wide/narrow	scope	debate	by	appealing	to	a	theory	of	fully	
rational	 attitudes.	 This	 paper	 argues	 that	 (i),	 (ii)	 and	 (iii)	 are	 incorrect.	 Replacing	 a	
wide-	with	a	corresponding	narrow-scope	requirement	 (or	vice	versa)	can	alter	 the	
set	 of	 circumstances	 in	 which	 a	 person	 is	 fully	 rational.	 The	 property	 of	 full	
rationality	 is	 therefore	 not	 independent	 of	 whether	 we	 formulate	 conditional	
requirements	 of	 rationality	 as	 having	 a	 wide	 or	 a	 narrow	 logical	 scope.	 As	 a	
consequence,	 the	 property	 of	 full	 rationality	 can	 guide	 us	 in	 determining	 what	
rationality	requires	–	even	in	cases	where	we	expect	a	precise	answer.		
	
1.	Advancing	the	debate	
	
The	 debate	 on	 the	 content	 and	 nature	 of	 rational	 requirements	 that	 govern	
attitudinal	coherence	faces	a	serious	obstacle.2	On	the	one	hand,	most	parties	
to	the	debate	agree	about	numerous	combinations	of	attitudes3	that	violate	a	
requirement	 of	 rationality.	 For	 example,	 if	 you	 hold	 a	 pair	 of	 contradictory	
beliefs	or	 intentions,	 fail	 to	 intend	a	means	 you	acknowledge	as	necessary	 to	
your	ends,	have	no	intention	of	doing	what	you	believe	you	ought	to	do,	hold	
intransitive	preferences,	or	assign	inconsistent	probabilities	to	states	of	affairs,	
you	violate	a	requirement	of	rationality.		
	
On	the	other	hand,	there	is	no	unified	agreement	on	how	we	should	formulate	
the	 requirements	 that	 are	 violated	 in	 the	 above	 examples.	 Philosophers	
disagree	 about	 the	 logical	 form	 of	 rational	 requirements	 and,	 in	 particular,	
about	whether	 those	 requirements	are	best	 formulated	as	 requirements	with																																																									
1	Department	of	Philosophy,	University	of	Berne,	Länggassstrasse	49a,	CH-3012	Bern,	Switzerland.		
2	I	assume	that	rationality	is	reducible	to	a	particular	kind	of	(structural)	coherence	among	a	person’s	
attitudes	 (cf.	 for	 example	 Scanlon	 2007;	 Broome	2013).	 I	 have	 argued	 elsewhere	 that	 this	 kind	 of	
coherence	 can	be	 cashed	out	 in	 terms	of	 the	possibility	of	 attitudinal	 success	 (Fink	2014	and	ms).	
However,	we	should	also	acknowledge	a	competing	(and,	it	seems,	increasingly	popular)	conception	
according	to	which	rationality	consists	in	responding	correctly	to	particular	normative	reasons	(see,	
for	 example,	 Lord	 2014a	 and	 forthcoming;	 Kiesewetter	 2013).	 For	 detailed	 criticism,	 see	 Broome	
2007d	and	2013a.	I	have	criticised	versions	of	this	view	in	Fink	(2014	and	ms).		
3	Throughout	this	paper,	I	use	‘attitude’	to	include	the	lack	of	an	attitude.		
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conditional	 contents	 or	 as	 conditionals	whose	 consequents	 express	 a	 rational	
requirement.		
	
Consider	an	illustration	of	this	problem.	Suppose	you	are	akratic:	you	have	no	
intention	to	X	even	though	you	believe	that	you	ought	to	X.	I	assume	that	you	
violate	 a	 requirement	 of	 rationality.4	But	 which	 precise	 requirement	 do	 you	
violate?	How	should	we	formulate	it?		
	
The	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 is	 not	 clear.	 There	 are	 at	 least	 two	 plausible	
formulations,	both	of	which	do	an	equally	good	job	of	generating	the	violation.	
According	to	the	first	formulation,	rationality	simply	prohibits	the	combination	
of	the	two	attitudes.	What	is	required	is	that	you	not	[believe	that	you	ought	to	
X	and	not	intend	to	X].	Or,	put	in	its	equivalent	material	conditional	form:		
	
(W)	 Necessarily:	rationality	requires	of	you	that	[(you	believe	you	
ought	to	X)	→	(you	intend	to	X)],		
	
where	→	 represents	a	material	 conditional.	 In	 (W)	 ‘rationality	 requires’	has	a	
wide	conditional	scope:	it	governs	the	entire	material	conditional	‘(you	believe	
you	ought	to	X)	→	(you	intend	to	X)’.	This	guarantees	that	by	believing	that	you	
ought	 to	 X	 without	 intending	 to	 X,	 you	 violate	 a	 rational	 requirement.	 (The	
conditional	 content	 of	 the	 requirement	 then	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 false.)	 It	 also	
guarantees	that	you	can	satisfy	this	requirement	by	either	intending	to	X	or	not	
believing	that	you	ought	to	X.	 (The	content	of	the	requirement	then	turns	out	
to	 be	 true.)	 Accordingly,	 (W)	 represents	 a	 first	 prima	 facie	 plausible	
requirement	formulation	that	would	ensure	the	irrationality	of	akrasia.		
	
According	 to	 the	 second	 formulation,	 ‘rationality	 requires’	 does	 not	 govern	 a	
material	 conditional.	 Instead,	 it	 says	 that	 either	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 you	
believe	that	you	ought	to	X	or	rationality	requires	you	to	intend	to	X.	Or,	again,	
expressed	with	the	help	of	a	material	conditional:		
	
(N)	 Necessarily:	 (you	 believe	 you	 ought	 to	 X)	 →	 [rationality	
requires	of	you	that	(you	intend	to	X)].			
	
In	(N)	‘rationality	requires’	has	a	narrow	conditional	scope:	it	governs	only	the	
consequent	 of	 the	material	 conditional	 ‘(you	 believe	 you	ought	 to	X)	→	 (you	
intend	 to	X)’.	 This	 also	 ensures	 that	akrasia	 is	 irrational.	 Your	 belief	 that	 you	
ought	 to	X	 entails	 that	 you	 are	 rationally	 required	 to	 intend	 to	X.	 But,	 being	
akratic,	you	do	not	intend	to	X.	Thus,	you	violate	a	requirement.	You	can	satisfy	
this	requirement	in	only	one	way,	i.e.	by	intending	to	X.	(N)	represents	a	second	
prima	facie	plausible	formulation	that	would	ensure	the	irrationality	of	akrasia.5		
																																																								
4	Within	 the	 recent	debate,	 see,	 for	example,	Broome	 (2013a,	2013b),	Brunero	 (2013),	and	Coates	
(2013)	and	Reisner	(2013)	on	the	irrationality	of	akrasia.		
5	Here	is	a	third	(but	implausible)	formulation:		
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Which	 formulation	 should	 we	 prefer:	 (W)	 or	 (N)?	 Also,	 which	 formulation	
should	 we	 employ	 as	 a	 model	 for	 stating	 other	 conditional	 requirements	 of	
rationality?	 In	 the	current	debate,	 these	are	open	questions.	Good	arguments	
are	 presented	 for	 and	 against	 both	 (types	 of)	 formulations.6	But	 are	 these	
arguments	really	worth	the	effort?	Is	the	question	whether	we	use	(W)-	or	(N)-
type	formulations	to	represent	a	rational	requirement	important?		
	
A	 close	 reading	 of	 the	 current	 debate	 suggests	 that	 it	might	well	 be.	 Indeed,	
there	 are	 good	 reasons	 to	 view	 the	 difference	 between	 (W)-	 and	 (N)-type	
requirements	 as	 in	 some	 sense	 fundamental	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 rational	
requirements.	 For	 example,	 the	 choice	 between	 either	 (W)-	 or	 (N)-type	
requirements	is	thought	to	influence	whether	the	requirements	of	rationality	…”	
	
	(i)	…		give	us	genuinely	symmetric	options	regarding	how	we	can		
		 	 	 satisfy	them	(Schroeder	2004);7		
(ii)	…	 are	prone	to	issue	contradictory	requirements	(Broome	2007a,		
		 	 	 2007b,	2013a;	Kolodny	2007b);8		
(iii)	…	 pick	out	necessary	conditions	for	being	fully	rational		
		 	 	 (Broome	2007b);9		
(iv)	…	 can	guide	the	formation	of	attitudes	(Reisner	2009);10		
(v)	…	 are	apt	for	constituting	standards	for	correct	reasoning		
		 	 	 (Kolodny	2005,	2007b;	Broome	2013a).11																																																																																																																																																						
	 (N*)	 Necessarily:	 (you	do	not	 intend	to	X)	→	 [rationality	requires	of	you	that	 (you	do	
not	believe	that	you	ought	to	X)].		
(N*)	says	that	not	intending	to	X	suffices	to	put	you	under	a	rational	requirement	not	to	believe	that	
you	 ought	 to	 X.	 But	 this	 is	 surely	 implausible.	 The	 absence	 of	 an	 intention	 to	 X	 is	 certainly	 not	
(conclusive)	evidence	of	its	not	being	the	case	that	you	ought	to	X.	I	will	therefore	not	include	(N*)	in	
my	discussion.		
6	See	 in	particular	Broome	 (1999,	2004,	2007a,	2007b,	 and	2013a),	Brunero	 (2010,	2012),	 Kolodny	
(2005,	2007a),	Rippon	(2011),	Schroder	(2004),	Shpall	(2013),	and	Way	(2010,	2011).		
7	Suppose	you	believe	you	ought	to	X,	but	you	have	no	intention	of	X-ing.	If	(W)	is	correct,	there	are	
two	genuinely	symmetrical	options	when	it	comes	to	satisfying	the	requirement.	You	can	intend	to	X	
or	you	can	be	such	that	you	do	not	believe	that	you	ought	to	X.	 If	 (N)	 is	correct,	 there	 is	only	one	
option,	i.e.	intending	to	X.	Not	believing	that	you	ought	to	X	is	then	not	an	option	when	it	comes	to	
satisfying	 the	 violated	 requirement.	On	 the	 question	 of	 symmetry,	 see	 Schroeder	 (2009),	 Kolodny	
(2005),	Brunero	(2010,	2012),	Bedke	(2009),	and	Way	(2010).		
8	Suppose	you	believe	you	ought	to	X,	and	you	believe	you	ought	to	not-X.	If	(N)	is	correct,	rationality	
issues	a	 set	of	 contradictory	 requirements	upon	you.	Rationality	 then	 requires	 you	 to	 intend	 to	X,	
and	it	requires	you	to	intend	to	not-X.	(W)	has	no	such	implication.			
9	Suppose	you	hold	only	one	irrational	combination	of	attitudes:	you	believe	you	ought	to	X,	but	you	
lack	an	intention	to	X.	If	(N)	is	correct,	you	are	rationally	required	to	intend	to	X.	However,	it	is	clear	
that	 ‘You	 intend	 to	 X’	 is	 not	 strictly	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 becoming	 fully	 rational.	 There	 are	
conceivable	situations	in	which	you	could	also	become	fully	rational	by	dropping	your	belief	that	you	
ought	to	X.	By	contrast,	 the	content	of	 (W)	seems	to	state	a	genuinely	necessary	condition	 for	 full	
rationality.	You	can	be	fully	rational	only	if	(you	intend	to	X	or	do	not	believe	that	you	ought	to	X).			
10	(N)-type	 requirements	 can	 guide	 the	 formation	of	 attitudes	 insofar	 as	 they	pick	 out	 a	 particular	
attitude	 that	 rationality	 requires	 you	 to	 have;	 (W)-type	 requirements,	 by	 contrast,	 do	not	 tell	 you	
which	particular	attitude	you	are	required	to	have;	they	leave	you	with	a	set	of	options.		
11	For	example,	you	can	reason	(correctly,	it	seems)	from	the	content	of	a	belief	that	you	ought	to	X	
to	an	 intention	to	X.	You	cannot	reason,	however,	 from	the	content	of	an	absent	 intention	to	X	 to	
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(vi)	…	 are	attitude	sensitive	in	their	application	(Broome	2007b;	Lord		
		 	 	 2014b).12		
The	 most	 important	 difference,	 however,	 lies	 elsewhere.	 Many	 philosophers	
suppose	that	rational	requirements	are	in	some	way	normative	(Kolodny	2007a,	
230;	see	Broome	2005;	2013a).	Interpreted	in	a	minimal13	yet	non-trivial	way,14	
this	 is	 to	 say	 that	 rational	 requirements	 entail	 normative	 reasons.15	Or,	more	
precisely:	
	
Reasons	 entailment.	 Necessarily:	 if	 rationality	 requires	 you	 to	 X,	
there	is	a	normative	reason	for	you	to	X.		
	
Should	we	endorse	this	entailment?	The	difference	between	(W)-	and	(N)-type	
requirements	 is	 fundamental	 to	 answering	 this	 question.	 Consider	 a	 logical	
consequence	 of	 conjoining	 (N)	 with	 Reasons	 entailment.	 (N)	 says	 that,	
necessarily,	if	you	believe	you	ought	to	X,	then	rationality	requires	you	to	intend	
to	X.	Reasons	entailment	implies	that,	necessarily,	if	rationality	requires	you	to	
intend	to	X,	then	there	is	a	normative	reason	for	you	to	intend	to	X.	By	virtue	of	
transitive	implication,	this	entails:			
	
Implication.	Necessarily:	if	you	believe	you	ought	to	X,	then	there	is	
a	normative	reason	for	you	to	intend	to	X.		
	
That	is:	by	adopting	a	belief	that	you	ought	to	X,	you	guarantee	the	existence	of	
a	normative	reason	to	intend	to	X.	Should	we	accept	Implication?		
	
According	to	a	central	finding	in	the	philosophy	of	reasons	and	rationality,	the	
answer	 is	 clearly	 ‘no’.	 Implication	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 so-called	 ‘bootstrapping	
objection’	 (Bratman	1987;	Broome	2001;	Piller	2013).	 It	 entails	 that	 for	any	X	
(e.g.	 ‘driving	 drunk’,	 ‘becoming	 a	 terrorist’,	 etc.)	 you	 can	 create	 a	 reason	 to	
intend	 to	 X	 simply	 in	 virtue	 of	 adopting	 a	 belief	 that	 you	 ought	 to	 X.	 Put	
succinctly,	 Implication	 licences	the	creation	of	normative	reasons	where	there	
aren’t	any.																																																																																																																																																						
suspending	 the	 belief	 that	 you	 ought	 to	X,	 because	 an	 absent	 intention	 to	X	 has	 no	 content	with	
which	 you	 can	 reason.	 (N),	 unlike	 (W),	 seems	 to	 capture	 this	 fact	 insofar	 as	once	 you	believe	 you	
ought	to	X	(and	you	do	not	intend	to	X),	you	can	only	satisfy	(N)	by	forming	an	intention	to	X,	not	by	
suspending	your	belief	that	you	ought	to	X.		
12	If	(N)	is	correct,	then	you	can	trigger	the	application	of	a	requirement	to	intend	to	X	by	believing	
that	you	ought	to	X.	If	(W)	is	correct,	the	application	of	the	requirement	is	not	in	any	way	sensitive	to	
whether	or	not	you	believe	that	you	ought	to	X.		
13	See	Broome	(2007c,	pp.	162-5)	on	why	this	is	a	minimal	or	‘weak’	version	of	the	view	that	rational	
requirements	are	normative.		
14 	There	 is,	 of	 course,	 a	 trivial	 sense	 in	 which	 rationality	 ‘[…]	 is	 automatically	 normative	 […].	
Rationality	 is	 a	 system	 of	 requirements	 or	 rules.	 It	 therefore	 sets	 up	 a	 notion	 of	 correctness:	
following	the	rules	is	correct	according	to	the	rules.	That	by	itself	makes	it	normative	in	one	sense,	
because	in	one	sense	‘normative’	simply	means	to	do	with	norms,	rules	or	correctness.	Any	source	of	
requirements	 is	 normative	 in	 this	 sense.	 For	 example,	 Catholicism	 is.	 Catholicism	 requires	 you	 to	
abstain	from	meat	on	Fridays.	This	is	a	rule,	and	it	is	incorrect	according	to	Catholicism	to	eat	meat	
on	Fridays.	So	Catholicism	is	normative	in	this	sense’	(Broome	2007c,	p.	162).		
15	See	Southwood	(2008)	and	Reisner	(2011)	for	attempts	to	explain	and	defend	this	view.		
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Let	me	illustrate	this	point.	Suppose	you	have	no	normative	reason	to	intend	to	
kill	 yourself.	 Nothing	 speaks	 in	 favour	 of	 such	 an	 intention.	 You	 also	 do	 not	
believe	 that	 you	 ought	 to	 kill	 yourself.	 Suppose	 now	 that,	 as	 a	 result	 of	
someone’s	spiking	your	coffee	with	a	dangerous	pill,	you	come	to	believe	that	
you	 ought	 to	 kill	 yourself.	 Does	 this	 suffice	 to	 create	 a	 normative	 reason	 to	
intend	to	kill	yourself?	That	is,	can	we	create	a	reason	to	intend	to	X	by	merely	
adopting	the	view	that	we	ought	to?	Evidently,	the	answer	is	‘no’.	A	mere	belief	
that	you	ought	to	kill	yourself	cannot	‘bootstrap’	such	a	reason	into	existence.	It	
cannot	create	reasons	where	there	are	none.	In	general,	reasons	for	intending	
to	 X	 depend	 on	 whether	 (intending	 to)	 X	 is	 good	 or	 choiceworthy	 (in	 the	
relevant	 sense).	 They	 do	 not	 depend	 on	 whether	 one	 judges	 X	 to	 be	 good,	
choiceworthy,	or	obligatory.		
	
The	 consequence	 of	 this	 is	 plain:	 Implication	 states	 an	 untenable	 entailment	
relation	between	what	you	believe	you	ought	to	do	and	what	reasons	there	are.	
Since	 Implication	 is	 a	 logical	 consequence	 of	 conjoining	 (N)	 with	 Reasons	
Entailment,	at	least	one	of	these	two	propositions	must	be	incorrect	too.	
	
Unlike	 (N),	 (W)	does	not	give	 rise	 to	 incredible	bootstrapping	when	conjoined	
with	Reasons	entailment.	Suppose,	necessarily,	there	is	a	normative	reason	for	
you	 to	 satisfy	 (W).	 This	 does	not	 imply	 that	 your	belief	 that	 you	ought	 to	 kill	
yourself	entails	a	reason	to	intend	to	kill	yourself.	Instead,	it	implies	that	there	
must	be	a	reason	to	satisfy	the	following	relation:	either	it	is	not	the	case	that	
you	believe	that	you	ought	to	kill	yourself	or	you	intend	to	kill	yourself.	This	is	a	
reason	 to	 be	 ought-belief/intention	 coherent.	 It	 is	 not	 a	 reason	 to	 have	 a	
particular	 intention.	 Hence,	 accepting	 (W)	 and	 Reasons	 entailment	 does	 not	
force	one	 to	embrace	a	kind	of	bootstrapping	of	normative	 reasons	 that	goes	
beyond	a	normative	reason	for	being	coherent.		
	
In	sum:	conjoining	(N)	and	Reasons	entailment	entails	Implication.	By	contrast,	
conjoining	 (W)	 and	 Reasons	 entailment	 does	 not	 entail	 Implication.	 Since	
Implication	 represents	 an	 unacceptable	 form	 of	 bootstrapping,	 Reasons	
entailment	 does	 not	 seem	 tenable	 in	 conjunction	 with	 a	 regime	 of	 (N)-type	
requirements.	 Thus,	 in	 order	 to	 advance	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 normativity	 of	
rational	requirements,	we	first	need	to	settle	the	choice	between	(W)-	and	(N)-
type	 requirements.	 We	 need	 to	 devise	 a	 method	 that	 tells	 us	 whether	
‘rationality	 requires’	 takes	 a	 wide	 or	 a	 narrow	 logical	 scope	 in	 formulating	
conditional	requirements	of	rationality.		
	
How	can	we	choose	between	(W)	and	(N)?	In	general:	how	can	we	identify	what	
rationality	requires	and	when	it	requires	something	of	us?	Not	many	systematic	
approaches	 have	 been	 put	 forward.	 Broome,	 and	 others,	 find	 themselves	 ‘…	
forced	to	appeal	largely	to	our	intuitions’	(Broome	2013a,	p.	150).	However,	in	
his	 recent	 work	 (2007a,	 2007b,	 2013),	 Broome	 argues	 against	 the	 very	
possibility	of	a	seemingly	promising	strategy.	I	will	call	it	the	‘property	strategy’.	
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Roughly,	 the	 property	 strategy	 says	 that	 we	 can	 employ	 the	 property	 of	 full	
rationality	in	deciding	what	rationality	requires	of	us	and	when	it	does	so.		
	
This	 strategy	 has	 three	 steps:	 first,	 we	 develop	 a	 theory	 about	 which	
combinations	of	attitudes	and	mental	processes	are	 in/consistent	with	having	
the	property	of	full	rationality.	Second,	we	determine	whether	(or	which)	(W)-	
or	 (N)-type	 requirements	 are	 (more)	 conducive	 to	 our	 theory	of	 fully	 rational	
attitudes.	And	 finally,	we	choose	between	 (W)-	and	 (N)-type	 requirements	on	
the	 basis	 of	 which	 logical	 form	 fits	 best	 with	 our	 theory	 of	 fully	 rational	
attitudinal	combinations	and	mental	processes.		
	
Broome	views	this	strategy	as	futile.	He	argues	this	as	a	technical	point	(2007a,	
pp.	363-4;	2013,	p.	134):	as	far	as	the	property	of	full	rationality	is	concerned,	
(W)	 and	 (N)	 turn	out	 to	 be	 equivalent.	 I	 shall	 call	 this	 ‘property	 equivalence’.	
That	is,	the	combinations	of	attitudes	under	which	you	are	fully	rational	under	a	
regime	of	(N)-type	requirements	are	identical	to	the	combinations	of	attitudes	
under	which	 you	 are	 fully	 rational	 under	 a	 regime	of	 corresponding	 (W)-type	
requirements.	 Thus,	 replacing	 an	 (N)-type	 requirement	 with	 a	 (W)-type	
requirement	(or	vice	versa)	does	not	affect	the	combinations	of	attitudes	that	
are	consistent	with	full	rationality.	Any	attempt	to	decide	between	(N)	and	(W)	
by	considering	the	property	of	full	rationality	is	thus	destined	to	fail.	
	
However,	Broome’s	rejection	of	the	property	strategy	is	too	quick.	In	this	paper,	
I	will	 argue	 that	we	 should	not	 dispense	with	 the	property	of	 rationality	 as	 a	
guide	in	settling	the	debate	between	(W)-	and	(N)-type	requirements.	Replacing	
an	(N)-type	with	a	(W)-type	requirement	can	indeed	alter	the	combinations	of	
attitudes	 that	 are	 consistent	with	 having	 the	 property	 of	 full	 rationality.	 This	
does	not,	of	course,	undermine	Broome’s	own	defence	of	the	wide-scope	form	
of	conditional	requirements	of	rationality.	Yet	it	shows	that	we	should	make	use	
of	 the	 property	 of	 rationality	 in	 settling	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 scope	 of	 rational	
requirements.	
	
Part	 of	 what	 makes	 Broome’s	 argument	 authoritative	 is	 that	 he	 tries	 to	
establish	 property	 equivalence	 with	 a	 formal	 theorem	 and	 a	 corresponding	
proof	(2007a,	pp.	369-70;	2007b,	pp.	39-40;	2013a,	p.	148).	Although	Broome’s	
theorem	 is	 correct	 (as	 I	 show	 in	 §	 6),	 it	 fails	 to	 establish	what	 he	 intends	 to	
establish,	 i.e.	 property	equivalence.	 In	particular,	 the	 theorem	 is	premised	on	
the	 implicit	 but	 implausible	 exclusion	 of	 a	 particular	 entailment	 relation	 that	
may	hold	between	rational	requirements.	The	theorem	excludes,	 for	 instance,	
the	existence	of	requirements	that	prohibit	intending	that	X	if	one	knows	that	X	
will	lead	one	to	have	an	attitude	one	is	rationally	required	not	to	have.	So,	while	
Broome	 manages	 to	 prove	 property	 equivalence	 for	 a	 system	 of	 rational	
requirements	 that	 excludes	 such	 requirements,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 no	
justification	 for	 excluding	 them.	 Broome	 is	 thus	 unable	 to	 sustain	 his	
methodological	 point.	 There	 are	 situations	 in	 which	 we	 can	 decide	 between	
(W)-	 and	 (N)-type	 requirements	 by	 considering	 attitudinal	 combinations	 that	
are	 fully	 rational.	 Thus	 the	 property	 of	 rationality	 might	 help	 us	 to	 make	
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progress	 on	 some	 of	 the	 questions	 that	 have	 traditionally	 been	 linked	 to	 the	
scope	of	rational	requirements.	
This	 paper	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 §	 2	 introduces	 the	 semantic	 framework	 for	
rational	 requirements	 that	 Broome	 employs	 in	making	 his	 equivalence	 claim.	
§	3	defines	Broome’s	equivalence	claim,	 i.e.	the	claim	that	the	property	of	full	
rationality	 remains	 unaffected	 by	 replacing	 a	 (W)-type	 with	 an	 (N)-type	
requirement	(or	vice	versa).	§	4	and	§	5	advance	an	argument	against	property	
equivalence.	I	will	put	forward	a	counterexample	according	to	which	one	is	fully	
rational	under	a	 (W)-type	requirement,	but	not	so	under	a	corresponding	(N)-
type	 requirement.	 §	 6	 turns	 to	 Broome’s	 formal	 theorem,	 which	 purports	 to	
vindicate	property	equivalence.	I	shall	demonstrate	that	Broome’s	theorem	fails	
to	justify	property	equivalence,	with	the	upshot	that	the	property	of	rationality	
is	 still	 available	 to	 us	 as	 a	 possible	 guide	 in	 constructing	 the	 logical	 form	 of	
rational	requirements.	There	are	situations	 in	which	the	property	strategy	can	
determine	 whether	 (N)-	 or	 (W)-type	 requirements	 represent	 rational	
requirements	correctly,	thereby	helping	us,	for	instance,	to	form	a	correct	view	
on	whether	 the	 bootstrapping	 objection	 poses	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 normativity	 of	
rational	requirements.		
	
2.	The	code	of	rationality		
	
How	can	we	decide	whether	(W)-	or	(N)-type	formulations	correctly	represent	a	
conditional	 requirement	 of	 rationality?	 Two	 things	 need	 to	 be	 taken	 into	
account:	(i)	‘rationality	requires’	is	by	and	large	‘…	a	philosopher’s	phrase	of	art’	
(Kolodny	2005,	p.	515);	and	(ii)	 (W)-	and	(N)-type	requirements	seem	to	differ	
significantly	with	regard	to	their	logical	properties.	Consequently,	as	a	first	step	
towards	 deciding	 on	 the	 correctness	 of	 (W)-	 and	 (N)-type	 requirements,	 we	
need	 to	 work	 towards	 a	 semantics	 of	 ‘rationality	 requires’	 (Broome	 2007a,	
p.	361).	
	
Broome	 proposes	 a	 general	 semantic	 framework	 for	 rational	 requirements	
(2007a).	His	framework	is	 in	fact	so	general	that	it	could	be	adopted	for	other	
systems	 of	 requirements,	 such	 as	 morality	 or	 prudence	 (Broome	 2007b	 and	
2013a).	 Nonetheless,	 Broome	 employs	 this	 framework	 to	 render	 precise	 key	
notions	 concerning	 rationality	 and	 its	 requirements	 and	 to	 expose	 the	 exact	
difference	between	(W)-	and	(N)-type	requirements.	He	also	uses	the	semantic	
framework	in	his	proof	that	(W)-	and	(N)-type	requirements	are	equivalent	with	
respect	to	the	property	of	rationality.		
	
In	essence,	Broome’s	 framework	rests	on	two	general	stipulations	 (2007a,	pp.	
361-3).	 First,	 for	 every	 possible	 world	w,	 there	 is	 a	 set	 of	 propositions	 that	
rationality	requires	of	you.	That	 is,	at	w,	p	 is	a	member	of	 the	set	of	required	
propositions	if	and	only	if,	at	w,	rationality	requires	of	you	that	p.	Second,	there	
is	a	function	that	relates	worlds	to	sets	of	required	propositions.		
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This	function	is	called	the	‘code	of	rationality’	(or	just	‘code’	hereafter).	A	code	
is	 a	mapping	 from	worlds	 to	 sets	 of	 required	 propositions.	 A	 complete	 code	
thus	determines	 for	all	worlds	w	 and	all	 propositions	p	whether	or	not	p	 is	 a	
member	 of	 the	 set	 of	 required	 propositions	 at	 w.	 Less	 technically,	 a	 code	
specifies	what	rationality	requires	of	you	and	when	it	does	so.	
	
Broome’s	 general	 code	 semantics	 also	 allows	 us	 to	 define	 when	 a	 person	
possesses	the	property	of	full	rationality.	That	 is,	at	w,	you	are	fully	rational	 if	
and	only	 if,	at	w,	every	proposition	in	w’s	set	of	required	propositions	–	call	 it	
RP(w)	–	is	true	at	w	(Broome	2007a,	p.	362).	
	
In	 assigning	 required	 propositions	 to	 worlds,	 a	 code	 will	 satisfy	 a	 variety	 of	
constraints.	Some	constraints	will	be	purely	formal.	Since	a	code	is	a	function,	it	
cannot	 assign	 two	 different	 sets	 of	 required	 propositions	 to	 the	 same	world.	
Other	 constraints	will	 stem	 from	 the	 logic	of	 rational	 requirements.	A	 correct	
code	may,	for	example,	satisfy	a	‘no-conflict’	constraint,	as	it	exists	in	standard	
deontic	logic	(Broome	2007a,	p.	365;	2013a,	p.	122).	That	is,	necessarily,	if,	at	w,	
p	 is	 an	 element	 of	RP(w),	 then	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 not-p	 is	 an	 element	 of	
RP(w).	Other	constraints	will	be	more	substantive.	I	assume,	for	instance,	that	if,	
at	w,	you	possess	no	capacity	for	rationality	(i.e.	logical	and	reasoning	abilities),	
then	RP(w)	will	be	the	empty	set.16	
	
Some	 constraints	will	 represent	 individual	 requirements.	 I	 will	 thus	 call	 them	
‘individual	 constraints’.	 Put	 roughly,	 an	 individual	 constraint	 signifies	 how	 a	
code	injects	a	particular	proposition	into	RP(w).	Individual	constraints	allow	us	
to	 express	 precisely	when	 a	 code	 instantiates	 a	wide-	 and/or	 a	 narrow-scope	
requirement.	 In	 principle,	 a	 code	 instantiates	 a	 narrow-scope	 requirement	 if	
and	 only	 if	 (NC)	 describes	 how	 a	 code	 injects	 a	 proposition	 into	 the	 set	 of	
required	propositions.	This	description	reads	as	follows:			
	
(NC)	 For	all	w:	(p	∈	w)	→	[q	∈	RP(w)],		
	
where	w	represents	a	possible	world,	p	and	q	stand	for	individual	propositional	
attitudes	of	yours,	∈	reads	as	‘is	an	element	of’,	and	RP(w)	represents	the	set	of	
rationally	 required	propositions	 at	w.	 (NC)	 says	 that	 for	 all	 possible	worlds	 in	
which	p	holds	true,	it	also	holds	true	that	q	is	a	proposition	that	is	required	by	
rationality.		
	
Analogously,	a	code	 instantiates	a	wide-scope	requirement	 if	and	only	 if	 (WC)	
describes	how	a	code	injects	a	proposition	into	the	set	of	required	propositions.	
This	description	reads	as	follows:			
	
(WC)	 For	all	w:	(p→q)	∈	RP(w).		
																																																									
16	I	elaborate	this	point	in	Fink	(2014).			
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(WC)	 says	 that	 it	 holds	 for	 all	 possible	 worlds	 that	 the	 truth	 of	 the	material	
conditional	p→q	is	rationally	required	of	you.		
	
In	sum,	the	code	semantics	helps	us	to	expose	the	precise	difference	between	
wide-	 and	 narrow-scope	 requirements.	 (WC)-type	 requirements	 require	 the	
truth	of	the	material	conditional	p→q	(i.e.	either	(p	and	q),	or	(p	and	not-q),	or	
(not-p	 and	 not-q)).	 They	 do	 so	 at	 all	 possible	worlds.	 (NC)-type	 requirements	
require	the	truth	of	q.	They	do	so	at	all	worlds	in	which	p	holds	true.	
	
3.	Property	equivalence		
	
I	now	turn	to	the	claim	that	 (WC)-	and	(NC)-type	requirements	are	equivalent	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 property	 of	 full	 rationality.	 Consider	 two	 individual	
propositional	attitudes,	p	and	q.	Suppose	that	the	conjunction	of	[p	and	not-q]	
(but	 neither	 p	 nor	 not-q	 individually)	 necessarily	 results	 in	 your	 violating	 a	
rational	requirement.	(As	indicated	in	§	1,	you	could,	for	example,	think	of	p	as	
standing	for	‘You	believe	that	you	ought	to	X’	and	q	as	standing	for	‘You	intend	
that	you	X’.)	Which	individual	constraint	should	we	assign	to	a	code	in	order	to	
guarantee	this?		
	
As	far	as	this	point	is	concerned,	we	have	a	choice:	we	could	assign	either	(WC)	
or	(NC).	Any	code	that	satisfies	at	least	one	of	these	constraints	will	ensure	that	
whenever	[p	and	not-q]	is	an	element	of	w,	the	set	of	required	propositions	at	
w	–	RP(w)	–	will	contain	at	least	one	false	proposition.	But	how	can	we	decide	
between	 (WC)	 and	 (NC)?	 That	 is,	which	 constraint	 –	 (WC)	 or	 (NC)	 –	 correctly	
represents	a	conditional	requirement?		
	
In	 answering	 this	 question,	 Broome	 rejects	 the	 strategy	 of	 choosing	 between	
(WC)	and	(NC)	by	considering	when	one	is	fully	rational.	In	 	Rationality	 Through	
Reasoning,	he	emphasises	this	point	as	follows:		
	
One	 putative	 approach	 to	 answering	 the	 question	 about	 scope	 will	 definitely	 not	
work.	It	will	do	no	good	to	think	about	the	property	that	corresponds	to	the	source	
of	requirements	we	are	investigating.	[…]	You	might	think	we	could	start	by	working	
out	 implications	wide-scope	and	narrow-scope	requirements	have	 for	 the	property	
of	[full]	rationality.	It	might	turn	out	that	one	gives	a	better	account	of	the	property	
than	the	other.	But	actually	this	is	not	so.	(Broome	2013a,	pp.	133-4)		
	
That	 is	 to	 say:	 we	 cannot	 first	 define	 the	 attitudinal	 combinations	 that	 are	
in/consistent	 with	 having	 the	 property	 of	 full	 rationality	 and	 then	 choose	
between	 (WC)	 or	 (NC)	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	 formulation	 best	 matches	 our	
account	 of	 fully	 rational	 attitudes.	 This	 strategy	 is	 untenable,	 Broome	argues,	
because	(WC)	and	(NC)	are	too	similar.	(WC)	and	(NC)	are	‘property	equivalent’	
when	it	comes	to	the	property	of	full	rationality:		
	
There	is	less	difference	between	[(WC)	and	(NC)]	than	one	might	think.	Perhaps	the	
most	 important	 question	 a	 system	 of	 rational	 requirements	 needs	 to	 settle	 is	
whether	you	are	[fully]	rational—have	the	property	of	[full]	rationality.	 It	 turns	out	
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that	 the	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 is	unaffected	 by	 the	 choice	 between	 narrow	 and	
wide	 scope.	 The	 proposition	 that	 you	 are	 rational	 is	 the	 same	 whichever	 way	 a	
conditional	 requirement	 is	 formulated.	 Either	way,	 you	 are	 rational	 at	 exactly	 the	
same	worlds.	(Broome	2007a,	p.	363;	emphasis	added)		
	
In	 sum,	 the	 logical	 form	 of	 a	 conditional	 requirement	 is	 immaterial	 to	 the	
question	of	when	a	person	is	fully	rational.	By	manipulating	a	code	only	to	the	
effect	that	it	satisfies	(NC)	instead	of	(WC)	(or	vice	versa),	one	does	not	change	
the	set	of	combinations	of	attitudes	that	are	consistent	with	full	rationality.		
	
For	the	sake	of	precision,	let	me	make	this	point	more	formally.	Take	a	code	–	
R1	 –	 that	 satisfies	 (WC)	 for	 a	 pair	 of	 propositions	 p	 and	 q.	 That	 is	 to	 say:	R1	
distributes	(p→q)	to	the	set	of	required	propositions	at	all	worlds.	Perform	the	
following	operation	on	R1.	First,	only	remove	(WC)	from	R1.	Thus	R1	no	 longer	
distributes	 (p→q)	 to	 the	 set	 of	 required	 propositions	 at	 all	 worlds.	 Second,	
apply	 (NC)	 to	R1.	 Call	 the	 resulting	 code	R2.	 So,	R2	distributes	q	 to	 the	 set	 of	
required	 propositions	 at	 all	 worlds	 where	 p	 holds	 true.	 Then	 R1	 and	 R2	 are	
‘property	equivalent’	in	the	following	sense:		
	
Property	equivalence.	Necessarily:	at	w,	you	are	fully	rational	under	R1	if	and	
only	if,	at	w,	you	are	fully	rational	under	R2.		
	
4.	A	counterexample		
	
As	 noted	 above,	 Property	 equivalence	 has	 not	 received	 much	 critical	
attention. 17 	This	 is	 surprising	 because	 its	 correctness	 could	 reduce	 the	
significance	of	the	ongoing	wide/narrow	scope	debate.18	To	the	degree	that	‘…	
the	most	important	question	a	system	of	rational	requirements	needs	to	settle	
is	 whether	 you	 are	 [fully]	 rational	 –	 have	 the	 property	 of	 [full]	 rationality’	
(Broome	2007a,	p.	363),	Property	equivalence	threatens	the	importance	of	the	
scope	distinction.19		
	
However,	 this	 lack	 of	 critical	 attention	 is	 also	 a	 mistake,	 since	 Property	
equivalence	 is	 incorrect.	 By	 changing	 a	 code	merely	 such	 that	 it	 now	 satisfies	
(WC)	 rather	 than	 (NC),	 one	 can	 alter	 the	 combinations	 of	 attitudes	 that	 are	
consistent	with	being	fully	rational.	So,	even	when	we	are	only	concerned	with	
the	property	of	rationality,	the	question	of	scope	is	highly	significant	after	all.		
	
																																																								
17	Kolodny	(2007b)	and	Žarnić	(2010)	represent	two	exceptions.		
18	Compare,	for	example,	Broome	(1999,	2007a,	2013a),	Brunero	(2010,	2012),	Evers	(2011),	Kolodny	
(2007b),	Rippon	(2011),	Shpall	(2013),	and	Way	(2010).		
19	Niko	Kolodny	emphasises	this	point	very	eloquently:		
For	 years	 now,	 it	 has	 seemed	 to	 Broome	 and	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 us,	 who	 have	 been	 so	
stimulated	by	his	work,	 that	there	 is	a	crucial	difference	between	the	wide	and	narrow	
scope.	Time	and	again,	Broome	has	urged	us	to	appreciate	this	important	difference,	and	
by	 and	 large	 we	 have	 been	 convinced.	 On	 closer	 inspection,	 however,	 the	 difference	
seems	almost	negligible.	(Kolodny	2007b,	p.	375)	
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Consider	first	an	entirely	schematic	counterexample	to	Property	equivalence.20	
Compare	 two	 codes:	 RW	 and	 RN.	 Both	 satisfy	 two	 individual	 constraints:	 RW	
satisfies	(WC)	and	(LR).	(LR)	reads	as	follows:		
	
	 (LR)	 For	all	w:	[q	∈	RP(w)]	→	[r	∈	RP(w)].21	
	
(LR)	constrains	a	code	as	follows:	suppose	that,	at	w,	q	is	among	the	rationally	
required	 propositions.	 Then,	 at	 w,	 r	 is	 also	 among	 the	 rationally	 required	
propositions.	 That	 is,	 you	 cannot	 be	 rationally	 required	 to	 q	 without	 being	
required	to	r.	
	
Correspondingly,	 RN	 satisfies	 (NC)	 and	 (LR).	 RN	 is	 thus	 the	 result	 of	 only	 one	
operation	 performed	 on	 RW,	 namely	 the	 replacement	 of	 (WC)	 with	 (NC).	
Accordingly,	 RW	 and	 RN	 fall	 within	 the	 range	 of	 Property	 equivalence.	
Schematically,	the	situation	is	as	follows:		
	
Code	(RW)	 Code	(RN)	
	
(WC)	For	all	w:	(p	→	q)	∈	RP(w).	
(LR)	For	all	w:	[q	∈	RP(w)]	→		
[r	∈	RP(w)].	
	
	
(NC)	For	all	w:	(p	∈	w)	→	[q	∈	RP(w)].	
(LR)	For	all	w:	[q	∈	RP(w)]	→		
[r	∈	RP(w)].	
	
	
Compare	 RW	 with	 RN.	 According	 to	 Property	 equivalence,	 the	 following	
proposition	should	hold	true:	necessarily,	at	w,	you	are	fully	rational	under	RW	if	
and	only	if,	at	w,	you	are	fully	rational	under	RN.	But	this	is	not	the	case.	There	is	
a	possible	situation	 in	which	you	are	 fully	rational	under	RW	and	are	 less	 than	
fully	rational	under	RN.		
	
Suppose	 that,	at	w’,	 [p,	q,	and	not-r]	 signifies	a	conjunction	of	your	attitudes.	
Under	RN,	you	cannot	be	fully	rational	at	w’.	To	show	this,	conjoin	(NC)	with	p.	
This	entails	that,	at	w’,	q	is	a	required	proposition.	Next,	conjoin	the	fact	that	q	
is	 a	 required	 proposition	 with	 (LR).	 This	 entails	 that,	 at	 w’,	 r	 is	 a	 required	
																																																								
20	Kolodny	 (2007b,	p.	376)	also	presents	an	argument	against	Property	equivalence.	He	argues	 that	
Property	 equivalence	 fails	 to	 hold	 for	 ‘process	 requirements’,	 as	 he	 puts	 it.	 However,	 Kolodny’s	
counterexample	proves	incorrect.	This	is	shown	in	the	appendix	to	this	paper.	
21	I	have	encountered	the	claim	that	(LR)	is	in	tension	with	Broome’s	code	semantics.	This	is	because	
(LR)	fails	to	specify	a	unique	code.	True,	a	code	could	satisfy	(LR)	in	various	ways.	It	could	satisfy	(LR),	
for	 example,	 by	 virtue	 of	 its	 being	 necessarily	 not	 the	 case	 that	q	 is	 a	 required	 proposition	 at	w.	
Alternatively,	a	code	could	satisfy	(LR)	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	r	is	a	required	proposition	necessarily.	
This	claim	puzzles	me,	however.	Broome’s	(and	my)	aim	is	to	establish	whether	exchanging	wide-	for	
narrow-scope	requirements	(or	vice	versa)	can	influence	the	property	of	full	rationality.	To	do	so,	we	
are	in	fact	forced	to	formulate	constraints	on	codes	that	fail	to	pick	out	a	unique	code.	For	even	by	
making	a	code	behave	 in	accordance	with	a	narrow-scope	requirement	(i.e.	constraining	a	code	so	
that	it	satisfies	(NC)	[i.e.	For	all	w:	(p	∈	w)	→	[q	∈	RP(w)]),	one	does	not	specify	a	unique	code.	As	
with	 (LR),	 a	 code	 can	 satisfy	 (NC)	 in	 different	 ways,	 e.g.	 by	 ensuring	 that	 p	 is	 necessarily	 not	 an	
element	of	w	or	by	q’s	being	necessarily	required.	
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proposition.	However,	at	w’,	not-r	holds	true.	So,	you	cannot	be	fully	rational	at	
w’	under	RN.		
	
This	is	not	so	under	RW,	however.	You	can	be	fully	rational	under	RW	at	w’.	First,	
(WC)	assigns	p→q	as	a	required	proposition	to	w’.	The	fact	that,	at	w’,	both	p	
and	 q	 hold	 true	 ensures	 the	 truth	 of	 p→q.	 (LR)	 says	 that	 r	 is	 a	 required	
proposition	at	w’	whenever	q	 is	 a	 required	proposition	at	w’.	However,	 given	
what	we	know	of	RW	and	w’,	under	RW,	there	is	no	need	to	assume	that	q	 is	a	
required	propositions	at	w’.	Also,	there	is	no	need	to	assume	that,	under	RW,	r	is	
a	required	proposition	at	w’.	So,	under	RW,	you	can	be	fully	rational	at	w’.		
	
Of	course,	this	result	requires	two	things.	First,	conjoining	p	and	(WC)	does	not	
entail	that	q	is	a	required	proposition	via	‘factual	detachment’.	Second,	it	is	not	
the	 case	 that	p	 is	 a	 necessary	 attitude	 of	 yours.	 I	 take	 both	 conditions	 to	 be	
unproblematic.	
	
Put	schematically,	‘factual	detachment’	licenses	an	inference	from		
	
		 (i)	at	w,	‘p→q’	is	a	required	proposition		
and		
		 (ii)	at	w,	p		
to		
		 (iii)	at	w,	q	is	a	required	proposition.		
	
If	 this	were	correct,	 [p,	q,	 and	not-r]	would	not	be	consistent	with	being	 fully	
rational	under	RW.	At	w’,	by	 conjoining	p	 and	 (WC),	q	would	 turn	out	 to	be	a	
required	 proposition.	 (LR)	 would	 then	 imply	 that,	 at	 w’,	 r	 is	 a	 required	
proposition.	 Ad	 hypothesis,	 r	 is	 not	 the	 case	 at	 w’.	 You	 would	 not	 be	 fully	
rational	under	RW.	
	
Likewise,	we	need	to	assume	that	p	 is	not	necessarily	 true.	Otherwise,	q	 (and	
therefore	r)	would	again	 turn	out	 to	be	required	under	RW	–	this	 time	via	not	
‘factual’	 but	 rather	 ‘necessary’	 detachment	 (Broome	 2013a,	 p.	 123),	 i.e.	 a	
plausible	inference	to	(iii)	from	(i)	and		
	
(ii’)	at	w,	necessarily	p.		
	
As	 above,	 [p,	 q,	 and	 not-r]	 would	 not	 be	 consistent	 with	 being	 fully	 rational	
under	RW.		
	
It	 is	 easy	 to	 avoid	 ‘necessary	 detachment’.	 We	 are,	 of	 course,	 entitled	 to	
stipulate	 that	p	 stands	 for	 a	 non-necessary	 attitude.	 That	 is,	p	 represents	 an	
attitude	of	yours	 that	you	have	at	 some	but	not	all	possible	worlds.	 I	 assume	
this	holds	true	for	most,	if	not	all,	attitudes.		
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Likewise,	‘factual	detachment’	does	not	pose	a	problem	either.	I	assume	that	it	
is	invalid.	First,	it	resembles	an	invalid	modal	inference:		
	
Necessarily:	[(I	am	unmarried)	→	(I	am	a	bachelor)]		
and	
I	am	unmarried.		
So		
		 Necessarily:	I	am	a	bachelor.		
	
No	 doubt,	 this	 is	 incorrect	 (cf.	 Rippon	 2011,	 pp.	 4-5).	 ‘Factual	 detachment’	 is	
also	philosophically	unattractive.	If	we	were	to	allow	it,	(WC)-codes	would	be	as	
open	 to	 the	 bootstrapping	 objection	 as	 (NC)	 ones.	 I	 therefore	 reject	 ‘factual	
detachment’.		
	
The	upshot,	 then,	 is	 this:	p,	q,	and	not-r	are	 jointly	consistent	with	being	 fully	
rational	 at	 w’	 under	 RW.	 However,	 this	 is	 not	 so	 under	 RN.	 There	 is	 a	
combination	of	attitudes	that	permits	full	rationality	under	RW	but	does	not	do	
so	under	RN.	RW	and	RN	are	not	equivalent	with	respect	to	the	property	of	full	
rationality.	Property	equivalence	is	incorrect.	
	
5.	Beyond	the	conceptual	result			
	
So	far,	I	have	shown	that,	conceptually,	the	choice	between	wide-	and	narrow-
scope	 requirements	 is	 not	 negligible	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 property	 of	 full	
rationality.	 Replacing	 a	 wide-	 with	 a	 narrow-scope	 requirement	 can	 logically	
alter	the	circumstances	in	which	you	are	fully	rational.		
	
This	 is,	 I	 believe,	 an	 interesting	 theoretical	 result.	 However,	 it	 does	 not	 yet	
imply	 that	 there	 is	 a	 correct	 code	 for	which	 replacing	 a	wide-	with	 a	 narrow-
scope	requirement	will	actually	change	the	circumstances	in	which	you	are	fully	
rational	under	that	code.	This	depends	on	whether	we	can	find	a	code	for	which	
either	 (WC)	 or	 (NC),	 taken	 together	with	 (LR),	 represents	 a	 correct	 individual	
constraint.	Only	then	can	we	guarantee	that	the	property	of	full	rationality	can	
actually	 help	 us	 to	 determine	 whether	 (WC)	 or	 (NC)	 represents	 a	 rational	
requirement	correctly.		
	
Recall	 (LR).	 It	 says	 that	 one	 required	 proposition	 entails	 another	 required	
proposition.	 However,	 you	 might	 think	 that	 required	 propositions	 are	 not	
related	in	this	way.	Hence,	a	code	that	satisfies	(LR)	cannot	represent	a	correct	
code	of	rationality.		
	
This	 reaction	would	 clearly	 be	ad	hoc.	 It	 is	 not	 unnatural	 to	 constrain	 a	 code	
such	 that	a	 required	proposition	 implies	another	 required	proposition.	Take	a	
code	that	injects	a	conjunction	of	beliefs	–	‘You	believe	that	a	and	you	believe	
that	b’	–	into	the	set	of	required	propositions	at	all	worlds.	It	seems	natural	to	
think	that	this	code	will	also	inject	each	conjunct	–	‘You	believe	that	a’	and	‘You	
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believe	that	b’	–	into	the	code	of	required	propositions	at	all	worlds.	A	required	
proposition	may	thus	entail	another	required	proposition.		
	
Next,	 consider	 a	 concrete	 example,	 where	 replacing	 a	 wide-	 with	 a	 narrow-
scope	 requirement	 changes	 the	 circumstances	 in	which	 you	are	 fully	 rational.	
Suppose,	at	world	w*,	 (i)	 you	believe	 that	you	ought	give	up	 smoking	and	 (ii)	
you	do	not	believe	 that	 it	 is	not	 the	 case	 that	 you	ought	 to	give	up	 smoking.	
However,	 (iii)	 you	 believe	 that	 if	 you	 have	 a	 conversation	 with	 Simon22	(a	
passionate	smoker	and	a	master	of	persuasion),	you	will	(instantly)	believe	that	
it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 you	 ought	 to	 give	 up	 smoking.	 Nevertheless,	 (iv)	 you	
intend	to	have	a	conversation	with	Simon.		
	
Let	us	construe	a	code	–	RW*	–	that	permits	your	being	fully	rational	at	w*.	RW*	
may,	for	instance,	satisfy	the	following	(WC)-type	constraint:		
	
Wide	ought-belief	consistency.	For	all	w:	[B(O)	→	¬B(¬O)]	∈	RP(w),		
	
where	B	stands	for	‘You	believe	that’,	O	for	‘You	ought	to	give	up	smoking’,	and	
¬	 for	 negation.	 Expressed	 informally,	Wide	 ought-belief	 consistency	 says	 that	
rationality	requires	you	not	to	have	contradictory	ought-beliefs.	More	formally,	
it	 says	 that,	 at	 all	 possible	worlds,	 the	material	 conditional	 ‘(you	 believe	 you	
ought	to	give	up	smoking	→	it	is	not	the	case	that	you	believe	that	it	is	not	the	
case	that	you	ought	to	give	up	smoking)’	is	a	rationally	required	proposition.		
	
Wide	ought-belief	consistency	may	constrain	RW*.	RW*	is	a	code	under	which	you	
can	be	fully	rational	at	w*.	At	w*,	(i)	you	believe	you	ought	to	give	up	smoking,	
and	 (ii)	 you	 have	 no	 belief	 that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 you	 ought	 to	 give	 up	
smoking.	 So,	 at	 w*,	 you	 satisfy	 the	 requirement	 that	 wide	 ought-belief	
consistency	represents.		
	
Consider	another	possible	constraint	on	RW*:		
	
Safety.	 For	all	w:	{[¬B(¬O)	∈	RP(w)]	&	B[X→B(¬O)]}	→	[¬I(X)	∈	RP(w)],		
	
where	I	stands	for	‘You	intend	that’,	and	X	stands	for	‘You	have	a	conversation	
with	Simon’.	The	general	idea	behind	Safety	is	that	rationality	requires	you	not	
to	 intend	anything	that	you	believe	will	bring	about	a	situation	that	violates	a	
requirement	of	rationality.	That	is,	suppose	‘You	do	not	believe	that	it	is	not	the	
case	 that	 you	 ought	 to	 give	 up	 smoking’	 is	 a	 rationally	 required	 proposition.	
Suppose	also	that	you	believe	that	if	you	have	a	conversation	with	Simon,	then	
you	will	believe	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	you	ought	to	give	up	smoking.	Then,	
																																																								
22	In	other	words:	not	having	a	conversation	with	Simon	is	a	necessary	condition	for	not	coming	to	
believe	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	you	ought	to	give	up	smoking.		
	 15	
as	Safety	expresses,	 ‘You	do	not	 intend	 to	have	a	conversation	with	Simon’	 is	
also	a	rationally	required	proposition.23			
	
As	with	Wide	ought-belief	consistency,	Safety	may	constrain	RW*.	It	permits	you	
to	be	fully	rational	at	w*.	This	requires,	of	course,	that	(ii)	 ‘You	do	not	believe	
that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 you	 ought	 to	 give	 up	 smoking’	 is	 not	 a	 required	
proposition	at	w*.	For	if	(ii)	were	a	required	proposition	at	w*,	Safety	would,	in	
conjunction	 with	 (iii)	 and	 (iv),	 entail	 that	 RP(w*)	 contains	 at	 least	 one	 false	
proposition	at	w*.		
	
However,	we	need	not	assume	that	(ii)	 is	a	member	of	RP(w*).	First,	as	I	deny	
factual	detachment,	conjoining	(i)	with	Wide	ought-belief	consistency	does	not	
imply	that	(ii)	is	required	at	w*.	Second,	I	assume	that,	at	w*,	it	is	not	the	case	
that	 (i)	 is	a	necessary	attitude	of	yours.	This	prevents	 (ii)’s	being	 injected	 into	
RP(w*)	via	necessary	detachment.24	Safety	can	hence	constrain	R(w*)	too.		
	
Moreover,	 I	 think	that	Safety	 is	a	plausible	constraint	on	a	code	of	rationality.	
Consider	 an	 analogy	with	moral	 requirements.	 Suppose	 that	 racist	 beliefs	 are	
gravely	 immoral	 (cf.	Appiah	1990;	Lengbeyer	2004).	Racist	beliefs	are	not	only	
false	but	also	dispositions	to	act	 immorally.	Thus,	 if	r	expresses	racist	content,	
then	morality	requires	you	not	to	believe	r.	Suppose	now	that	you	believe	that	
having	a	conversation	with	William	–	a	persuasive	racist	–	will	lead	you	to	form	
a	cluster	of	racist	beliefs.	It	seems	very	plausible	that	in	this	situation	morality	
requires	you	not	to	 intend	to	have	a	conversation	with	William.	Put	generally,	
morality	requires	you,	among	other	things,	not	to	intend	to	engage	in	behaviour	
that	will	make	you	gravely	immoral.		
	
A	similar	argument	suggests	itself	for	Safety	and	rationality.	Rationality,	 I	have	
already	assumed,	aims	at	attitudinal	coherence.	Roughly,	this	is	to	say	(as	I	have	
argued	 in	detail	 in	Author’s	 paper)	 that	 rationality	 aims	 at	 ensuring	 that	 your	
attitudes	 can	 simultaneously	 fulfil	 their	 ‘constitutive	 aims’	 (or	 ‘success	
conditions’).	 For	 example,	 I	 assume	 that	 beliefs	 aim	 constitutively	 at	 truth,	
intentions	 at	 implementation,	 and	 ought-beliefs	 at	 both	 truth	 and	
implementation.		
	
Suppose	 now	 that	 rationality	 requires	 you	 to	 abstain	 from	believing	 that	 it	 is	
not	the	case	that	you	ought	to	give	up	smoking.	Given	my	account	of	coherence,	
this	is	the	case	only	if	abstaining	from	having	this	belief	is	pivotal	to	preserving	
your	 attitudes’	 ability	 simultaneously	 to	 fulfil	 their	 constitutive	 aims.	 Suppose																																																									
23	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	I	have	kept	a	temporal	restriction	on	Safety	implicit.	Suppose	rationality	
requires	you	not	to	have	a	particular	ought-belief	–	call	it	BO	–	between	December	1st	and	December	
24th.	 Suppose	 too	 that	before	December	1st	 and	after	December	24th,	 you	are	not	 required	not	 to	
have	BO.	Then	Safety	implies	a	requirement	not	to	intend	X	if	and	only	if	you	believe	that	[X	will	make	
you	adopt	BO	 between	December	1st	 and	December	24th].	 Suppose	 you	believe	 instead	 that	 [X	will	
make	 you	adopt	BO	 only	 before	December	1st	 and/or	after	December	24th].	 Then,	 I	 assume,	Safety	
does	not	imply	a	rational	requirement	not	to	intend	to	X.		
24	Compare	§	4	for	a	brief	discussion	of	‘factual’	and	‘necessary	detachment’.		
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you	believe,	however,	that	having	a	conversation	with	Simon	will	cause	you	to	
believe	that	 it	 is	not	the	case	that	you	ought	to	give	up	smoking.	 Intending	to	
have	a	conversation	with	Simon	therefore	jeopardizes	your	attitudes’	ability	to	
fulfil	 their	 constitutive	 aims.	 Rationality	 thus	 requires	 you	 not	 to	 have	 this	
intention.	 In	 general,	 as	 in	 the	moral	 example,	 rationality	 requires	 you	not	 to	
intend	 anything	 you	 believe	 will	 cause	 you	 to	 have	 an	 attitude	 for	 which	 it	
happens	to	be	true	that	rationally	requires	you	not	to	have	it.		
	
Here	 is	 another	 brief	 way	 to	 consolidate	 this	 point.	 Having	 a	 pair	 of	
contradictory	 intentions	 is	 one	 clear	 way	 to	 be	 incoherent.	 You	 cannot	
implement	both	intentions.	Thus,	rationality	requires	you	not	to	have	a	pair	of	
contradictory	 intentions.	 However,	 intending	 to	 have	 a	 pair	 of	 contradictory	
intentions	is	also	a	distinctive	way	of	being	incoherent.	It	is	to	aim	to	implement	
something	that	cannot	itself	be	implemented.	This	is	why,	I	assume,	rationality	
requires	you	not	to	intend	to	have	a	pair	of	contradictory	intentions.	This	lends	
support	to	viewing	Safety	as	a	plausible	requirement	of	rationality.		
	
I	now	return	to	Property	equivalence.	Recall	that	RW*	is	a	code	under	which	you	
are	 fully	 rational	 at	 w*.	 Apply	 the	 instructions	 from	 Property	 equivalence:	
remove	Wide	 ought-belief	 consistency	 from	 RW*	 and	 inject	 its	 narrow-scope	
equivalent	 (i.e.	 ‘narrow	 ought-belief	 consistency’)	 into	 RW*.	 Call	 the	 resulting	
code	RN*.	‘Narrow	ought-belief	consistency’	reads	as	follows:			
	
Narrow	ought-belief	consistency.	For	all	w:	[B(O)	∈	w]	→	[¬B(¬O)	∈	RP(w)].	
	
Narrow	ought-belief	consistency	 says	 that	whenever	you	believe	you	ought	 to	
give	up	smoking,	 ‘You	do	not	believe	 that	 it	 is	not	 the	case	 that	you	ought	 to	
give	up	smoking’	is	a	rationally	required	proposition.	In	general,	as	long	as	you	
believe	something,	rationality	requires	you	not	to	believe	its	negation.		
	
In	sum,	RW*	and	RN*	compare	as	follows:		
	
Code	(RW*)	 Code	(RN*)	
	
(Wide	ought-belief	consistency)	
For	all	w:	[B(O)	→	¬B(¬O)]	∈	RP(w).	
	
(Safety)	
For	all	w:	{[¬B(¬O)	∈	RP(w)]	&	
B[X→B(¬O)]}	→	[¬I(X)	∈	RP(w)].	
	
(Narrow	ought-belief	consistency)	
For	all	w:	[B(O)	∈	w]	→	[¬B(¬O)	∈	RP(w)].	
	
(Safety)	
For	all	w:	{[¬B(¬O)	∈	RP(w)]	&	
B[X→B(¬O)]}	→	[¬I(X)	∈	RP(w)].	
	
Property	equivalence	predicts	that	you	are	fully	rational	under	RW*	if	and	only	if	
you	are	fully	rational	under	RN*.	However,	w*	shows	this	to	be	incorrect.		
	
I	have	already	shown	that	you	are	fully	rational	under	RW*.	However,	this	is	not	
so	under	RN*.	Recall	w*:	(i)	you	believe	that	you	ought	to	give	up	smoking,	and	
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(ii)	you	do	not	believe	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	you	ought	to	give	up	smoking.	
Furthermore,	 (iii)	you	believe	that	 if	you	have	a	conversation	with	Simon,	you	
will	believe	that	it	 is	not	the	case	that	you	ought	to	give	up	smoking.	Also,	(iv)	
you	 intend	 to	 have	 a	 conversation	 with	 Simon.	 Conjoining	 (i)	 with	 Narrow	
ought-belief	consistency	of	RN*	 implies	that	 ‘It	 is	not	the	case	that	you	believe	
that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 you	 ought	 to	 give	 up	 smoking’	 is	 a	 required	
proposition	at	w*.	Conjoining	this	with	the	fact	that	(iii)	you	believe	that	[if	you	
have	a	conversation	with	Simon,	then	you	believe	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	you	
ought	to	give	up	smoking],	implies,	via	Safety,	that,	at	w*	‘It	is	not	the	case	that	
you	 intend	 to	 have	 a	 conversation	 with	 Simon’	 is	 a	 required	 proposition.	
However,	 ad	 hypothesis,	 at	w*,	 (iv)	 you	 intend	 to	 have	 a	 conversation	 with	
Simon.	So	while,	at	w*,	you	are	fully	rational	under	RW*,	this	is	not	so	under	RN*.		
	
Again,	Property	 equivalence	 proves	 incorrect.25	This	 time,	 however,	 it	 does	 so	
for	 what	 I	 take	 to	 be	 a	 plausible	 set	 of	 codes.	 This	 shows	 that	 there	 are	
situations	 in	 which	 the	 property	 of	 full	 rationality	 can	 actually	 help	 us	 to	
determine	 the	 scope	 of	 a	 conditional	 requirement	 of	 rationality.	 Wide-	 and	
narrow-scope	 requirements	 differ	 practically	 in	 more	 respects	 than	 Broome	
suggests.	
	
6.	Broome’s	theorem	
	
This	 result	 is	 surprising.	 Broome	 does	 not	 defend	 Property	 equivalence	 in	
passing.	 Rather,	 he	 attempts	 to	 prove	 Property	 equivalence	 by	 formulating	 a	
general	theorem	and	a	corresponding	proof.		
	
This	 final	 section	 turns	 to	Broome’s	 theorem.	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 fails	 to	 vindicate	
Property	equivalence.	Though	formally	correct,	the	theorem	neither	represents	
nor	 entails	Property	 equivalence.	 In	 fact,	 the	 theorem	 is	 too	weak	 to	 support	
the	following	two	main	points:	(i)	you	can	replace	a	wide-	with	a	narrow-scope	
requirement	(and	vice	versa)	without	changing	the	conditions	under	which	you	
are	 fully	 rational;	 and	 (ii)	 ‘[…]	we	cannot	decide	between	 the	wide-scope	and	
narrow-scope	 formulations	 by	 considering	 when	 you	 have	 the	 property	 of	
rationality’	(Broome	2007a,	p.	364).																																																										
25	Kolodny	(2007b,	p.	375,	n.	6)	claims	that	‘Broome	might	have	proved	a	more	general	claim’	than	
Property	equivalence.	This	is	also	incorrect,	however.	Here	is	Kolodny’s	claim:	
	
Take	two	codes	of	rationality	according	to	which	(however	different	they	may	otherwise	
be)	 the	 proposition	 that	 you	 are	 rational	 is	 the	 same.	 Add	 a	 narrow-scope	 conditional	
requirement	 to	one	code	and	 the	corresponding	wide-scope	 requirement	 to	 the	other.	
Then	the	proposition	that	you	are	rational	remains	the	same.	(Kolodny	2007b,	p.	375,	n.	
6)		
	
I	shall	call	this	‘addition	equivalence’.	Both	of	my	counterexamples	show	that	addition	equivalence	is	
incorrect.	 Let	RN	and	RW	be	 two	 codes	 and	 assume	 that:	 (i)	 both	pick	 out	 the	 same	 circumstances	
under	which	you	are	fully	rational,	and	(ii)	both	contain	Safety.	Add	Wide	ought-belief	consistency	to	
RW	and	Narrow	ought-belief	consistency	to	RN.	As	I	have	demonstrated	above,	there	is	a	combination	
of	attitudes	under	which	you	are	fully	rational	under	RW	and	not	so	under	RN.		
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To	see	this,	first	consider	Broome’s	theorem26:		
	
Theorem.	Let	R1	and	R2	be	two	codes	that	are	the	same	except	that,	for	one	
pair	of	propositions	p	and	q,	q	∈	R1(w)	for	all	w	at	which	p	 is	true	(and	this	
may	not	be	so	for	R2)	whereas	(p	→	q)	∈	R2(w)	for	all	w	(and	this	may	not	be	
so	 for	 R1).	 Then	 ‘You	 are	 [fully]	 rational’	 is	 true	 under	 R1	 at	 exactly	 those	
worlds	where	it	is	true	under	R2.	(Broome	2007a,	p.	369)		
	
To	avoid	confusion,	note	that	R1	and	R2	represent	entire	codes.	R1(w)	and	R2(w)	
stand	 for	 corresponding	 sets	 of	 rationally	 required	 propositions.	 Theorem	
claims	the	following.	Suppose	two	codes,	R1	and	R2,	differ	only	in	the	following	
way:	 for	 a	 pair	 of	 propositions	p	 and	q,	R1	 satisfies	 (NC)	 and	does	 not	 satisfy	
(WC).	 Analogously,	 R2	 satisfies	 (WC)	 and	 does	 not	 satisfy	 (NC).	 In	 all	 other	
respects,	R1	and	R2	are	identical.	Then	the	two	codes	pick	out	the	same	set	of	
worlds	at	which	you	are	fully	rational.		
	
Unlike	Property	equivalence,	Theorem	 is	 correct.27	It	 is	 relatively	easy	 to	 show	
this.	Let	R1	and	R2	differ	in	terms	of	precisely	the	two	properties	that	Theorem	
assigns	to	R1	and	R2.	That	is:	R1	satisfies	(WC)	and	not	(NC);	R2	satisfies	(NC)	and	
not	(WC).	In	all	other	respects,	R1	and	R2	are	identical.	This	effectively	turns	the	
comparison	of	R1	and	R2	 into	a	comparison	between	R1*	and	R2*,	where	both	
codes	only	satisfy	one	constraint:	R1*	only	satisfies	 (NC)	and	R2*	only	satisfies	
(WC).		
	
Let	 us	 compare	R1*	 and	R2*.	 Under	R1*,	q	 is	 rationally	 required	 of	 you	 at	 all	
worlds	where	p	holds	true,	whereas	under	R2*	(p→	q)	 is	rationally	required	of	
you	 at	 all	 worlds.	 Thus,	 under	 both	 R1*	 and	 R2*,	 you	 violate	 a	 rational	
requirement	 (and	are	not	 fully	 rational)	 at	w	 if	 and	only	 if,	 at	w,	p	 and	not-q	
hold	 true	 of	 you.	 In	 all	 other	 situations,	 you	 are	 fully	 rational.	 Consequently,	
Broome’s	Theorem	is	correct.	
	
But	why	does	 this	 fail	 to	 vindicate	Property	 equivalence?	Recall	 that	Property	
equivalence	implies	that	by	replacing	(NC)	with	(WC)	(or	vice	versa)	in	a	code	R1,	
one	 creates	 another	 code	 R2,	 which	 picks	 out	 the	 same	 set	 of	 worlds	 (and	
combinations	of	attitudes)	at	which	you	are	fully	rational	as	that	picked	out	by	
R1.	 However,	 in	 contrast,	Theorem	 implies	 that	 if	R1	 and	R2	 differ	 only	 in	 the	
described	 way,	 then	 R1	 and	 R2	 pick	 out	 an	 identical	 set	 of	 worlds	 (or	
combination	 of	 attitudes)	 at	 which	 you	 are	 fully	 rational.	 The	 difference	 is	
subtle,	yet	significant.	
	
Here	is	when	it	is	significant.	Suppose	you	perform	only	the	following	operation	
on	 a	 code	 R:	 you	 remove	 (WC)	 and	 inject	 (NC).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 this	 may																																																									
26	I	cite	the	(2007a)	version	of	the	theorem	because	it	is	explicitly	about	the	code	of	rationality.		
27	This	holds	true	despite	an	error	 in	the	first	 two	versions	of	his	proof	 (Broome	2007a,	pp.369-70;	
2007b,	pp.	39-40),	which	Broome	successfully	corrected	in	the	latest	formulation	(2013a,	p.	148).	
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entail	that	the	resulting	code,	call	it	R*,	differs	in	ways	that	go	beyond	satisfying	
(NC)	rather	than	(WC).	It	may	differ	in	another	significant	respect.	By	replacing	
(WC)	with	(NC),	one	may	indirectly	apply	to	R*	another	constraint	that	does	not	
apply	 to	 R.	 This	 further	 constraint	 may	 manipulate	 the	 set	 of	 required	
propositions	such	that	it	becomes	possible	for	you	to	be	fully	rational	under	the	
original	but	not	under	the	resulting	code.	
	
The	counterexamples	in	§	4	and	§	5	represent	cases	in	point.	Recall	my	entirely	
schematic	 counterexample.	 In	 creating	 RN,	 I	 followed	 the	 instructions	 of	
Property	 equivalence.	 I	 removed	 (WC)	 from	 RW	 and	 applied	 (NC)	 instead.	 In	
doing	so,	however,	I	did	not	create	a	code	that	differs	from	the	original	code	RW	
with	 respect	 to	 at	most	 two	 properties.	 Instead,	 I	 created	 a	 code	 that	 differs	
from	RW	with	respect	to	more	than	two	properties.	By	replacing	(NC)	with	(WC),	
I	 indirectly	 injected	 another	 constraint	 –	 call	 it	 (CC)	 –	 into	 RN.	 (CC)	 reads	 as	
follows:	 ‘For	 all	w:	 (p	∈	w)	→	 [q	∈	 RP(w)]’.	 But	 I	 injected	 (CC)	 into	 RN	 only	
indirectly,	 in	 virtue	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 constraints	 on	 RN	 are	 closed	 under	
inference	by	modus	ponens.	The	following	table	represents	this	situation:		
	
Code	(RW)	 Code	(RN)	
	
(WC)	For	all	w:	(p	→	q)	∈	RP(w).	
	
(LR)	For	all	w:	[q	∈	RP(w)]	→	[r	∈	RP(w)].	
	
	
(NC)	For	all	w:	(p	∈	w)	→	[q	∈	RP(w)].	
	
(LR)	For	all	w:	[q	∈	RP(w)]	→	[r	∈	RP(w)].	
	
(CC)	For	all	w:	(p	∈	w)	→	[r	∈	RP(w)].	
	
I	showed	that	under	RW,	[p,	q,	and	not-r]	is	consistent	with	being	fully	rational,	
while	this	is	not	so	under	RN.	Replacing	a	(WC)-type	constraint	with	an	(NC)-type	
constraint	 can	 thus	 make	 a	 difference	 as	 to	 which	 attitudinal	 combinations	
count	as	fully	rational.		
	
However,	 Theorem	 evades	 this	 result.	 It	 does	 so	 by	 stipulating	 that	 the	 two	
codes	can	differ	only	with	respect	to	two	particular	constraints.	Yet	RW	and	RN	
differ	with	 respect	 to	more	 than	 two	constraints.	As	a	consequence,	Theorem	
disallows	the	comparison	of	a	(WC)-code	and	an	(NC)-code	if	these	codes	satisfy	
(LR),	 i.e.	one	required	proposition	implying	another	required	proposition.	(LR)-
codes	are	excluded	from	Theorem,	and	this	ensures	that	RW	and	RN	thereby	fall	
outside	 the	 theorem’s	 scope.	 Hence,	 Theorem	 remains	 immune	 to	 my	
counterexamples.		
	
But	 this	 immunity	comes	at	a	heavy	cost.	As	 I	have	argued	 in	§	5,	 there	 is	no	
good	reason	to	exclude	the	existence	of	(LR)-type	constraints	on	a	code.	In	§	5,	I	
presented	 (LR)-type	 constraints	 that	 I	 find	 plausible.	 Also,	 Broome	 has	 not	
offered	 any	 reasons	 to	 doubt	 their	 existence.	 This,	 however,	 undermines	 the	
aim	in	terms	of	which	Broome	advances	his	theorem.		
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Broome	 advances	 his	 theorem	 in	 order	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 ‘[…]	 we	 cannot	
decide	between	the	wide-scope	and	narrow-scope	formulations	by	considering	
when	you	have	the	property	of	[full]	rationality’	(2007a,	p.	364).	Under	Property	
equivalence,	 this	 would	 hold	 true.	 By	 excluding	 (LR)-type	 requirements,	
Theorem	fails	to	support	it.		
	
Again,	the	counterexample	in	§	5	shows	this.	Here	is	a	schematic	version	of	it.	
Suppose	you	believe	you	ought	 to	A	 and	you	do	not	believe	 that	 it	 is	not	 the	
case	that	you	ought	to	A.	Suppose,	further,	that	you	believe	that	if	you	do	not	
believe	that	 it	 is	not	the	case	that	you	ought	to	A,	then	you	do	not	X.	Yet	you	
intend	to	X.	Are	you	fully	rational?	
	
Suppose	 the	 answer	 is	 ‘yes’.	 Then,	 as	 long	 as	 Safety	 holds,	 this	 excludes	 the	
correctness	of	Narrow	ought-belief	consistency	(i.e.	if	you	believe	you	ought	to	
A,	 then	 rationality	 requires	of	 you	 that	you	not	believe	 that	 it	 is	not	 the	case	
that	 you	 ought	 to	 A).	 Narrow	 ought-belief	 consistency,	 in	 conjunction	 with	
Safety,	 entails	 that	 a	 required	 proposition	 fails	 to	 hold	 true	 of	 you.	 Under	
Narrow	ought-belief	consistency,	you	would	not	be	fully	rational.		
	
By	contrast,	suppose	that	the	answer	is	‘no’.	Then,	as	long	as	Safety	holds,	Wide	
ought-belief	 consistency	 (i.e.	 rationality	 requires	 you	 not	 to	 [believe	 that	 you	
ought	 to	 A]	 and	 [believe	 that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 you	 ought	 to	 A]	
simultaneously)	 cannot	 be	 correct,	 because	Wide	 ought-belief	 consistency,	 in	
conjunction	with	Safety,	does	not	entail	 that	any	 required	proposition	 fails	 to	
hold	 true	 of	 you.	 Under	 Wide	 ought-belief	 consistency,	 you	 would	 be	 fully	
rational.	 In	 sum	 –	pace	 Broome	 –	 the	 property	 of	 full	 rationality	 can	 help	 to	
determine	whether	a	conditional	requirement	takes	a	wide	or	a	narrow	scope.	
The	property	of	rationality	can	therefore	help	us	to	determine	what	rationality	
requires.		
	
7.	Conclusion		
	
In	the	debate	over	the	logical	form	of	rational	requirements,	it	has	been	argued	
(most	prominently	by	Broome)	that	the	difference	between	wide-	and	narrow-
scope	requirements	is	 immaterial	to	the	issue	of	when	a	person	possesses	the	
property	 of	 rationality.	 Suppose	 we	 propose	 a	 wide-scope	 requirement	 of	
rationality	 and	 replace	 it	 with	 its	 narrow-scope	 equivalent.	 This	 replacement	
will	 not	make	any	difference	when	 it	 comes	 to	determining	when	a	person	 is	
fully	 rational	 under	 the	 proposed	 requirement.	 There	 is	 no	 combination	 of	
attitudes	 that	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 rational	 under	 a	 regime	 of	 wide-scope	
requirements	 that	 would	 not	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 rational	 under	 a	 regime	 of	
equivalent	narrow-scope	requirements.		
	
In	this	paper,	I	show	that	this	is	incorrect.	First,	the	equivalence	claim	cannot	be	
established	by	Broome’s	theorem	and	proof	(see	§	6).	Second,	replacing	a	wide-	
with	 a	 narrow-scope	 requirement	 (or	vice	 versa)	 can	make	 a	 difference	 as	 to	
when	a	person	is	fully	rational.	As	I	have	demonstrated	in	§	4	and	§	5,	there	are	
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combinations	of	attitudes	that	are	rational	under	a	wide-scope	requirement	but	
fail	to	be	so	under	the	same	narrow-scope	requirement.	This	is	the	case	when	
the	 introduction	of	a	narrow-scope	 requirement	 triggers	 the	detachment	of	a	
further	requirement	that	was	not	detachable	under	a	wide-scope	requirement	
(as	 §	 4	 shows	 for	 a	 schematic	 code	 of	 requirements,	 and	 §	 5	with	 an	 actual	
code).		
	
This	result	presents	an	opportunity	for	the	debate	on	rational	requirements.	By	
following	the	equivalence	claim,	we	were	misled	into	accepting	that	we	cannot	
overcome	 the	 scope	 debate	 by	 examining	 whether	 wide-	 or	 narrow-scope	
requirements	 give	 a	 better	 account	 of	 the	 property	 of	 rationality.	 But	 this	
position	 is	 too	sceptical.	 In	 fact,	 it	deprives	us	of	an	 important	opportunity	 to	
make	 progress	 in	 the	 scope	 debate.	 There	 are	 situations	 in	 which	 deciding	
whether	 you	 are	 fully	 rational	 will	 also	 determine	 whether	 a	 particular	
requirement	has	a	wide	or	a	narrow	logical	scope.	So,	by	working	out	when	a	
person	 is	 fully	 rational,	we	 can	 also	make	 progress	 on	 the	 question	 of	which	
logical	form	represents	conditional	requirements	of	rationality.		
	
This	does	not	only	mean	progress	for	the	scope	debate.	It	will	also	prove	helpful	
for	advancing	answers	to	some	of	 the	most	 important	questions	 linked	to	the	
requirements	of	rationality.	Scope	and	logical	form	decide,	among	other	things,	
whether	 rational	 requirements	 can	 explain	 the	 correctness	 of	 reasoning,	 can	
guide	 our	 attitude	 formation,	 and	 are	 apt	 to	 serve	 as	 sources	 of	 normative	
reasons.		
	
Perhaps	most	importantly,	the	scope	of	rational	requirements	decides	whether	
the	 so-called	 bootstrapping	 objection	 entails	 a	 forceful	 argument	 against	 the	
normativity	 of	 rational	 requirements.	 As	 explained	 in	 §	 1,	 to	 assume	 that	
narrow-scope	requirements	are	normative	leads	to	incredible	bootstrapping.	It	
would	 licence	 the	 spurious	 fabrication	of	 normative	 reasons	where	 clearly	 no	
such	reasons	exist.	 In	order	to	maintain	a	normative	 interpretation	of	rational	
requirements,	 these	 requirements	must	have	a	wide	 logical	 scope.	Thus,	until	
we	settle	the	scope	question,	the	consequences	of	the	bootstrapping	objection	
for	 the	 normativity	 of	 rational	 requirements	 will	 remain	 undecided.	 This	
underlines	 why	 the	 result	 of	 the	 presented	 argument	 is	 important:	 if	 the	
property	of	rationality	can	help	us	to	resolve	the	scope	debate,	it	will	also	prove	
useful	for	deciding	whether	or	not	rational	requirements	are	normative.		
	
Thus,	research	on	rationality	should	no	longer	ignore	the	property	of	rationality.	
Indeed,	we	should	 try	 to	give	an	account	of	 the	property	of	 rationality	 that	 is	
independent	 of	 its	 requirements	 –	 an	 account	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	we	 can	
then	 determine	 precisely	 what	 rationality	 requires. 28																																																								
28	Of	 course,	 this	 proposal	 involves	 a	 considerable	 challenge.	 We	 need	 to	 establish	 a	 way	 to	
determine	the	property	of	 rationality	before	we	formulate	the	requirements	of	 rationality.	That	 is,	
we	need	 to	 find	a	way	 to	establish	 the	degree	of	 a	person’s	 rationality	 that	does	not	 rely	on	 first	
establishing	 which	 and	 how	 many	 rational	 requirements	 that	 person	 satisfies	 or	 violates.	 For	 a	
constructive	suggestion	on	this	point,	see	Fink	(2014	and	ms).	
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Appendix	
	
Kolodny’s	 counterargument.	 Kolodny	 (2007b,	 pp.	 375-6)	 argues	 that	 Property	
equivalence	 and	 Theorem	 do	 not	 hold	 for	 what	 he	 calls	 ‘process	
requirements’.29	I	argue	that	Kolodny	fails	to	show	this.	
	
Consider	 a	 simplified	 version	 of	 a	 narrow-scope	 conditional	 requirement,	 the	
wide-scope	counterpart	of	which	differs,	according	 to	Kolodny,	 in	 terms	of	 its	
conditions	of	violation:30	
	
Necessarily,	if,	at	t1,	you	believe	that	you	ought	to	X,	then	rationality	requires	of	
you	that,	at	t3,	you	intend	to	X,		
	
where	 time	 t1	 precedes	 t3.	 Expressed	 as	 a	 code	 constraint,	 this	 requirement	
reads	as	follows:		
	
(NP)	For	all	w:	Bt1[O(X)]	→	[It3(X)	∈	RP(w)],		
	
where	B	stands	for	‘you	believe	that’,	O	for	‘you	ought	to’,	and	I	for	‘you	intend	
to’.	The	corresponding	wide-scope	constraint	reads	as	follows:		
	
(WP)	For	all	w:	{Bt1	[O(X)]	→	It3(X)}	∈	RP(w).		
	
Kolodny	 thinks	 that	 there	 are	 situations	 in	which	 you	 are	 fully	 rational	 under	
(WP),	but	not	so	under	(NP).	His	argument	runs	as	follows	(2007b,	pp.	375-6):	
suppose	 that,	 at	 t1,	 you	 believe	 that	 you	 ought	 to	 X	 without	 intending	 to	 X.	
However,	 at	 t2	 (i.e.	 after	 t1	 and	 before	 t3),	 you	 abandon	 your	 belief	 that	 you	
ought	 to	X.	 Furthermore,	at	 t3,	 you	 fail	 to	 intend	 to	X.	Kolodny	argues	 that	 in	
this	situation	you	cannot	be	fully	rational	under	(NP).	Yet	(WP)	does	not	imply	
this.		
	
This	is	not	correct.	It	is	true	that	under	(NP)	you	are	not	entirely	rational.	Since,	
at	 t1,	 you	 believe	 that	 you	 ought	 to	 X,	 ‘At	 t3,	 you	 intend	 to	 X’	 is	 a	 required	
proposition.	But	this	proposition	turns	out	to	be	false.	You	are	not	fully	rational.	
However,	the	same	holds	for	(WP).	If,	at	t1,	you	believe	that	you	ought	to	X,	and,	
at	t3,	you	fail	to	intend	to	X,	you	are	also	not	entirely	as	rationality	requires	you	
to	be,	since	the	required	proposition	‘If,	at	t1,	you	believe	you	ought	to	X,	then,	
at	 t3,	 you	 intend	 to	X’	 turns	out	 to	be	 false.	This	 result	holds	despite	 the	 fact																																																																																																																																																						
	
29	Note,	 first,	 that	 Kolodny’s	 ‘process	 requirements’	 are	 not	 exactly	 process	 requirements:	 their	
contents	do	not	represent	a	process,	nor	is	a	process	necessary	for	their	satisfaction	(Fink	2011	and	
2012).	 These	 requirements	are	 in	 fact	diachronic	 requirements,	where	 rationality	 requires	a	 cross-
temporal	relation	among	attitudes.	
30	I	 have	 slightly	 adapted	 Kolodny’s	 formulation.	 Kolodny’s	 original	 formulation	 reads	 as	 follows:	
‘Necessarily,	if	you	believe	at	t	that	you	ought	to	X,	but	you	do	not	intend	at	t	to	X,	then	rationality	
requires	you	to	form	going	forward	from	t,	on	the	basis	of	the	content	of	your	belief,	the	intention	to	
X’	(2007b,	pp.	378-9).		
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that,	 at	 t2,	 you	drop	your	belief	 that	 you	ought	 to	X.	 Thus	Kolodny’s	example	
disproves	neither	Property	equivalence	nor	Theorem.	
	
Broome’s	 proof.	Broome	 (2007a,	 pp.	 369-70)	 provides	 us	with	 a	 proof	 for	 his	
theorem	 (see	§	6).	Although	Theorem	 proves	 correct,	Broome’s	original	proof	
does	not.	Here	is	why.		
	
Consider	only	the	final	part	of	the	proof.	Here,	Broome	tries	to	establish	that,	
necessarily,	 if	you	are	 fully	 rational	under	R2,	you	are	also	 fully	 rational	under	
R1:31		
	
[T]ake	a	world	w	where	‘You	are	rational’	is	true	under	R2.	I	shall	prove	it	is	also	
true	under	R1.	Since	w	satisfies	all	the	requirements	in	R2(w),	and	R1(w)	contains	
all	 the	same	requirements	apart	 from	the	single	one	that	differs,	w	 satisfies	all	
the	requirements	in	R1(w)	apart	from,	possibly,	that	final	one.	
Because	(p→q)	is	in	R2(w),	and	‘You	are	rational’	is	true	at	w	under	R2,	(p→q)	is	
true	at	w.	Either	p	is	true	at	w	or	it	is	not.	If	it	is,	then	q	is	in	R1(w):	q	is	required	
at	w	 according	 to	R1.	 And	 this	 requirement	 is	 satisfied;	q	 is	 true	 at	w	 because	
both	p	and	(p→q)	are	true	there.	On	the	other	hand,	if	p	is	not	true	at	w,	there	is	
no	 final	 requirement	 in	 R1(w)	 to	 be	 satisfied.	 Either	 way,	 w	 satisfies	 all	 the	
requirements	in	R1(w).	‘You	are	rational’	is	therefore	true	at	w	under	R1.	
	
Broome	argues	as	follows:	if	p	is	true	at	w,	and	you	are	fully	rational	under	R2,	
then	you	also	satisfy	all	requirements	under	R1.	Under	R2,	 (p→q)	 is	a	required	
proposition.	 At	 all	p-worlds	 (p→q)	 is	 true	 if	 and	only	 if	q	 is	 true.	 This	 in	 turn	
guarantees	that	you	also	satisfy	all	requirements	under	R1.	At	all	p-worlds,	q	is	a	
required	proposition	under	R1.		
	
What	about	not-p-worlds?	In	those	worlds,	(p→q)	is	true	in	virtue	of	p’s	being	
false.	Hence,	you	are	fully	rational	under	R2.	But	what	about	R1?	Broome	argues	
that	you	are	also	fully	rational	under	R1.	His	point	is	this:	‘if	p	 is	not	true	at	w,	
there	is	no	final	requirement	in	R1(w)	to	be	satisfied’.	That	is,	if	p	 is	false	at	w,	
then	q	is	not	a	required	proposition.		
	
Consequently,	Broome’s	proof	relies	on	the	following	principle	of	requirement	
‘avoidance’.	Described	as	a	constraint	of	a	code,	this	principle	reads	as	follows:		
	
Avoidance.	 Necessarily	 For	 all	 w:	 {{[p	 ∈	 w]	 →	 [q	 ∈	 RP(w)]}	
		 &	[¬p	∈	w]}	→	¬[q	∈	RP(w)].		
	
Less	 technically:	whenever	p	 implies	 that	 rationality	 requires	you	 to	q,	 then	 if	
not-p,	you	are	not	required	to	q.		
	
Avoidance	has	been	commonly	assumed	to	hold	true	for	requirements	that	are	
represented	by	a	code	satisfying	(NC)	(see,	for	example,	Broome	2007b,	p.	38;	
2013a;	Lord	2011;	Hill	1973;	Schroeder	2004,	2005,	p.	362;	and	Vranas	2008).																																																									
31	R1	and	R2	correspond	to	Broome’s	Theorem	here.		
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However,	the	logic	of	an	(NC)-code	fails	to	support	Avoidance.	So,	to	the	extent	
that	it	relies	on	Avoidance,	Broome’s	proof	contains	a	mistake.		
	
(NC)	 depicts	 the	 following	 constraint	 of	 a	 code:	 necessarily,	 if	w	 is	 a	p-world,	
then	q	 is	 a	 required	proposition	 at	w.	 The	 implication	here	 is	 a	material	 one.	
This	 is	 necessary,	 inter	 alia,	 to	 support	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 (WC)-type	
requirements:	 if	 (p→q)	 is	 a	 required	 proposition	 at	 w,	 you	 can	 satisfy	 the	
corresponding	requirement	by	ensuring	that	‘not-p’	holds	at	w.	However,	it	also	
implies	 that	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 (NC)-type	 requirements	 does	 not	 support	
Avoidance.	 In	 fact,	 Avoidance	 falls	 foul	 of	 the	 requirements	 of	 logic,	 as	 it	
represents	 the	 fallacy	 of	 denying	 the	 antecedent:	 the	 fact	 that	 p	 materially	
implies	that	q	is	a	required	proposition	does	not	imply	that	if	p	is	not	true,	then	
it	is	not	the	case	that	q	is	a	required	proposition.		
	
The	 following	example	 shows	why	 it	would	not	even	be	a	good	 idea	 to	 inject	
Avoidance	 into	 the	 logic	 of	 requirements	 that	 (NC)	 represents.	 Suppose	 you	
believe	 that	 you	ought	 to	drive	 carefully.	 Suppose	 this	 implies	materially	 that	
‘You	to	intend	to	drive	carefully’	is	rationally	required	of	you.	At	some	point	you	
drop	 your	 belief	 that	 you	 ought	 to	 drive	 carefully.	 This	 does	 not	 suffice	 to	
ensure	that	intending	to	drive	carefully	is	no	longer	rationally	required	of	you.	
For	example:	 suppose	 that	you,	at	 the	 same	 time,	 intend	 to	arrive	home	safe	
and	sound,	and	you	believe	that	a	necessary	condition	of	your	doing	so	is	that	
you	drive	carefully.	Intending	to	drive	carefully	will	still	be	rationally	required	of	
you	–	despite	your	having	dropped	the	belief	that	you	ought	to	drive	carefully.	
This	shows	that	Avoidance	is	not	correct.	Broome’s	proof	contains	a	mistake.32		
																																																								
32	I	 would	 like	 to	 point	 out	 that	 a	 similar	 proof	 in	 Broome	 (2013a,	 p.	 148)	 does	 not	 contain	 this	
mistake.		
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